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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of lJ ta.h 
PJIYLLIS K. STUBER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. ( Case No. 7764 
l-IAR VE'\:"" T. STUBER, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent herein concedes that the statement of facts 
as contained in the brief of .A.ppellant, insofar as the divorce 
being granted and the provisions of the decree of divorce: 
together with the affidavit of Re_spondent for an order to show 
cause against the Appellant, the answer of Appellant thereto 
and the reply of Respondent to Appellant,s answering affidavit 
as set forth in the brief of Appellant fron1 pages 1 to 5 are 
substantially correct and we need not set them forth herein 
(Tr. 1-15). 
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Pursuant to the foregoing the matter was transferred to 
the trial calendar for trial and said matter came on for hearing 
before the Honorable Judge Martin M. Larson on the 14th 
day of May 19 51, and after a trial being had on the issues 
raised by the respective pleadings of said parties, the court took 
the matter under advisement, and thereafter, on or about the 
1Oth day of September 19 51 rendered its decision _ herein 
( T r. 88-89-90) . Pursuant thereto the court signed and entered 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment 
therein on the' lOth day of September 1951 (Tr. 91 to 96 inc.) 
Thereafter Appellant filed a Motion for Amendment of Find-
ings and Judgment, (Tr. 98-99-100), whic~ motion, after 
hearing thereon was denied by the court on th~ 6th day of 
October 1951, (Tr. 101), from which judgment and denial 
of motion the Appellant takes this appeal ( T r. 102) . 
In the abstract of Appellant he raises the following points 
in which he contends the ·court erred in its decision: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT 
AWARDING THE CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL 
OF THE MINOR CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, TO THE 
RESPONDENT AND ERRED IN FAILING TO MODIFY 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE SO AS TO AWARD THE 
CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL OF THE MINOR 
CHILD TO THE APPELLANT, SUBJECT TO REASON-
ABLE VISITATION BY THE RESPONDENT. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDG~1ENT 
IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT AND AGAINST APPEL-
LANT FOR THE SU~f OF $220.00, BEING THE AMOUNT 
FOR WHICH RESPONDENT WAS AT SAID TIME IN-
DEBTED TO THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVE-
:t\TlJE .L~RISING OUT OF THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT 
FOR A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS CLr\IMED THE MINOR 
CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, AS A DEPENDENT IN HER 
INC0~1E TAX RETURN AND ALSO ERRED IN REQUIR-
ING THE APPELLANT TO PAY ANY OTHER SUM OR 
SUMS FOR \VHICH THE RESPONDENT lviiGHT BE-
C0~1E OBLIGATED TO PAY THE COLLECTOR OF IN-
TERNAL REVENUE BY REA~SON OF RESPONDENT 
CLAI~1ING S.AJD CHILD AS A DEPENDENT. 
-POINT III 
TI-fE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENl'ER JUDG· 
1v!ENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT AND AGAINST THE 
RESPONDENT MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
SO AS TO RELIEVE 1-.HE APPELLANT FROM TI-IE Pi\ .. Y-
1v1ENT OF FUT.UR.E- }-'-LIMOI\TY TO RESPONDENT. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RE-
SPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF $100.00. 
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ARGUMENT 
These joints of error raised by appellant will be taken up 
tn their respective order and replied to by Respondent, in 
which Respondent contends that the court's decision, findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and judgment were in accord-
ance with the testimony of the respective parties, and that the 
court did not err in rendering its decision and judgment in ac-
cordance therewith: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT 
AWARDING THE CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL 
OF THE MINOR CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, TO THE 
RESPONDENT AND ERRED IN FAILING TO MODIFY 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE SO AS TO AWARD THE 
CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL OF THE MINOR 
CHILD TO THE APPELLANT, SUBJECT TO REASON-
ABLE VISITATION BY THE RESPONDENT. 
As the issue of the ·marriage between these two people, 
they had one minor child, Bruce Stuber, who was some 14 
· months of age at the time of the divorce, and at the time. of 
this hearing said child wa~ 7 years of age (Tr. 20). 
At the time of the divorce, the respondent had no home 
to go to, and could not live with her parents because of the 
crowded condition of their home (Tr. 43-44), nor did the 
Respondent have anything upon which to live and she. had 
to go to work. to support herself (Tr. 21). She, however, 
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tnade an atten1pt to take saiJ chilJ and care for it, but she 
stated that she lived \vith another g~rl \vho had a child of her 
own and she was not \veil and she could not care for the child 
of the respondent, nor could the respondent leave the child 
with her mother because of the inability of her mother at 
that time to care for the child (Tr. 21). 
Respondent testified as-. follo\\~s: 
((He, (Appellant), told me that, when we \vere 
separated, that he wouldn't pay any money for the 
child nor myself if he had to rot in jail, so I let Bruce 
go down there to live.' 
Under the circumstances there \vas nothing the Respond-
ent could do, but take the matter up with Appellant as to the 
care of the child. 
Respondent testified further as follows: 
((So I talked with Mr. Stuber about it; as a matter of 
fact he approached me or Bruce of coming to live vv-ith 
him, saying his mother could watch him. I agreed to 
that proposition; for one thing, I didn't have the money 
to take care of him myself, nor no place to put hitn, 
and 1 agreed to it, "'ith the understanding that \vhen 
I got where I could take him back, I wanted hin1 back. 
We made an understanding that. he wouldn't pay 
me ... (Tr. 21). 
She further testified as follows: 
((So I let Bruce go down there to live. We also talked 
about who would claim Bruce as a dependent. I said 
I \\yould, and he agreed to it." (Tr. 22). 
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Q. Now cc as a dependent" for what purpose? 
A. For the purpose of claiming him on the income 
tax. He wouldn't pay me any money other than 
that; that was our agreement. 
Q. So, pursuant to that, you let him take the child? 
A. Yes, I did." (Tr. 22). 
Since that time the respondent testified she has not been 
in a position to take said child or care for it until now, as fol-
lows (Tr. 23): 
Q. No\v, have you been in a position financially, or 
otherwise, to take this child and support the child-
provide a place for it since that time ? 
A. Not until right now. 
Q. And will you tell the court now what your position 
is with relation to taking care of the child? 
A. My mother has agreed to take care of Bruce, keep 
him with her all the time and take care of him until 
I remarry so that I can tak~ care of him myself." 
On cross-examination of respondent about her remar-
riage, she testified as follows (Tr. 34): 
Q. Have you never remarr~ed, Mrs. Stuber? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. And, so far ·as you know, at the present time you 
don't expect to marry in the near future? 
A. I wouldn't say when, but I am going to get married. 
Q. Well, you mean you have a prospect now? 
A. Yes. 
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A. -of contracting marriage. Are you acquainted with 
Mr. Fred E. Bacon? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is he the man you expect to marry? 
A. Yes. 
Under the Statute- of the State of Utah, and generally 
everY'vhere, the mother of a child has the paramount right to 
the custody of a minor child, other matters bieng equal. 
Section 40-3-10 U.C.A. 1943: 
(tin any case of separation of husband and wife hav-
ing minor children, the mother shall be entitled to the 
care, control and custody of all child children, etc.'' 
Cook vs. Cook, U. 371, 248 Pac. 83: 
('In case of separation of husband and wife, the 
wife usually has no separate income apart from that 
of the husband. Such, however, is no legal reason to 
deny her the custody of· the minod child." 18~, S. \Y/. 
215 Ky. 
Respondent has no contention with the assertion of Ap-
pellant in his argument and citation of the case of Walton V. 
Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169, Pac. 2nd 97, that: 
((Child custody proceedings are equitable in the 
highest degree, and this court has consistently held 
that the best interest and welfare of the minor child 
is the controlling .factor in every case." 
and we agree with this doctrine, and it is the contention of the 
Respondent that the best interest of said child will be with her 
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and under her care, and in support of this contention we submit 
and refer to the evidence in this case. 
The only reason that Respondent ever let go of this child 
was because of financial inability to take and care for the 
child as appears from the evidence she introduced at the trial 
and referred to· hereinabove. She stated that she has never 
been in a position to take said child until now, but was now 
·in a position to take a.nd properly care for the child. Appellant 
argues that because of the fact that Respondent did not visit 
v1ith the child for the first two years after she let the Appellant 
have the child, that the Respondent has any interest in the 
child. We think the Respondent answers that question very 
well in her testimony as follows (Tr. 29-30): 
Q. For the first two years after Mr. Stuber took him, 
you hardly seen him, did you? 
A. That's true. 
Q. About two years, you didn't see him at all ? 
A. No, I felt like that, -if Bruce was going to stay 
there like he was, and I couldn't see any outlet as 
to how I was going to take care of him, I just felt 
it was for his own good that he had but very few 
people to take care of him and interfere as pos-
sible. I. wanted very much to see him, but I just 
couldn't see how I could make it, and I figured 
that it would just be better if he was left there 
like it was. I thought at the time he was better 
taken care of than he might have been, and I really 
couldn't say_ because I didn't see him in that long 
period of time." 
I am of the opinion this was a very reasonable and logical 
explanation on the part of Respondent why she did not see 
10 
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the child during this period. She had confidence in the ability 
of the Appellanf s mother to see that the child was taken care 
of properly, as she knew the qualities of the Appellant's 
mother. That to interfere with the child, by way of frequent 
visits, would endear the child to the mother, (Respondent), and 
"·ould have a disturbing effect upon the child. Respondent, 
under her financial and home condition, just could not take the 
child for the present or could not see her way clear in this 
respect for some time ahead. I think her wisdom in not seeing 
the child, (although she stated she '\\ranted very much to see 
him) , was good judgn1ent on her part and should not detract 
from her interest in the child. After this period of time she 
stated that she visited \vith the child at least twice a month, 
(Tr. 30), and has continued to do so. That she would have 
liked to have seen him more often had conditions been more 
favorable. There 'vas an undercurrent feeling existing between 
the Appellant and Respondent, which apparently prevented this 
as stated by Respondent in the following testimony ( T r. · 30) : 
Q. And when you did start seeing him, how often 
would you say you have seen him, about once a 
month? 
A. I have seen hitn more often than that, but, as I 
said, I would go down more often if I was treated 
like I was a human being. (Tr~ 31). 
Q. What is it you object to because we want to make 
it pleasant for you when you go to see the child? 
A. Well, I don't see why l have to stand outside, not 
that I really care to go in, that isn't the point, but 
at least people can.· treat you civil whei1 you go to 
get your own child. 
Q. Well, you mean they didn't iny.ite you in the house? 
11. 
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A. No, they never have since I and Harvey have been 
divorced. 
Q. In other words, you go there to get the child, then 
you knock and wait until they bring-
A. I knock and stand there, or he looks out the door. 
Q. Is that what you mean when you say you haven't 
been treated with proper courtesy ? 
A. Well, then I have to call up to get Bruce, and Mr. 
Stuber himself raised a big commotion. The child 
pleaded, . cried to go with me. Mr. Stuber wouldn't 
let him go at first, then he would call me up, say 
he could go because Bruce wanted to go, and, in 
the first place, I don't see why he wouldn't let 
him go when he wanted to go ~ith me. (Tr. 23). 
Q. Well, by reason of what? 
A. When I go down to see him, I am never asked · 
into their home. I am treated like an outsider. I 
have even had the door slamm~d in my face. 
From the foregoing and other testimony of the Respond-
ent (Tr. 39) it is made plain why the Respondent felt she was 
not free to see her child as often as she liked and rather than 
have such, difficulties as she complained of she did not see 
the child. She used good judgment in this respect. 
As to the question of the welfare of the child, Appellant 
states in his brief (p. 18), tcThe Respondent, herself, was 
unable to· disclose any want of care and consideration for the 
child." I ask th~ court to consider the following (T'r. 24) : 
Q. What is the relationship between you and the 
child; in other words, how does he feel towards you 
and you tovlard him, frotn your observations? 
A. We get along very well. He seems to en joy being 
12 
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with me. I enjoy being with him very much. (Tr. 
27-28). 
Q. Yes, and there has never been any time you know 
of when Bruce hasn't been well taken care of? 
A. I don't think he has been so well taken care of. 
Q. Well, since when? 
A. Since all the family went to work. 
Q. Well, put it this way then: So far as you observed 
the situation, he wasn't as well taken care of after 
Mrs. Stuber-that is Mr. Stuber's mother-went 
to work? 
A. Well, he was quite \veil taken care of, but I still 
don't think they gave him the love and affection 
that he needs. It is quite hard, I imagine, for people 
worlqng to take interest in what goes on, I imagine 
it would be. I know that, at times, I have got him 
when he hasn't been as clean as I would liked to 
see him be. 
Q. Well, that's the only thing you noticed? 
A. He is very thin and very nervous, and I imagine it 
is hard on him, as well as everyone concerned, to 
have so many bosses. He is very emotional, he 
runs constantly. He isn't much interested in very 
many things. I have asked him about things; he 
doesn't like school. I have asked him how he-
oh, what he does with his time, and ne never gives 
n1e an answer. He doesn't have any interest iri 
anything, as far as I can understand, jt:lst what he 
has told me. He has colds constantly .. He is always 
sick, it seems like. 
Q. Now, from your observation and wh~t you know, 
Mrs. Stuber, is Mr. Stuber and his present \vife and 
his mother, with whom the child ·lives, are all 
working? 
13 
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.. ., 
A. Yes, they are. 
Q. And how long has that ··been?-
A. Oh, it has been quite _sometime. I wouldn't say for 
sure. 
A. Harvey's :present wife has been working ever since 
s~e had her baby, as far as I know. 
_ Q ... When_ they are _working, what becomes of your 
child? · · 
}\._He is put in the hands of a baby-tender. 
Q. Has that been over a period, to your own knowl-
edge? 
A. Quit~ some time, I imagine. I know this one woman · 
who is _going to testify in court was there, from 
what -she ·told me, for almost a year. 
Q. :Now, have you made inquiry with relation to 
Bruce's attendance at school? (Objection) . 
Q. What have you fourid out, Mrs. Stuber-not a con-
versation :you have had, but what are the facts you 
have found? 
A. W9en Bru.,ce was first put in school, he wasn't even 
in schqol for almost a month. The teacher contacted 
the horne and· tried to get hold of the parents or 
his stepmother or father, and they got no reaction 
whatsoever from them. He was absent an awful 
lot.· lfe ·+was back ·in· his. school 'work·. Then they 
. took him deer hunting or ·somewhere for a couple 
of weeks. ·she said- it was-· -he was in and out of 
£!.(~ -~~ ~~~ :~: ~ 
-·school su much-they seemed to take no interest 
in it at all. She ev-en wrote ·notes· home and got no 
reply. 
. _ ,~_Fro~ furt~er ~-~~stimony of Respondent, and from infor-
mat19n she obtain~d ~tqm the school, the child has been playing 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
truant; that no one took enough interest in him to help him 
along with reading etc. (Tr. 38). 
have quoted at some length. from the transcript, but this 
I have done for the purpose of apprising the court in detail 
as to the neglect and conduct of this child. 
This child is and has been in the home of the father and 
his mother. The Appellant remarried and has one child. They 
all live in the same home. Mr. Stuber is a railroad man and is 
away from home a good portion of hi~ time. His wife has 
been working most of her married life. His mother likewise 
has to work and the child is left with a baby tender during 
their absence from the home. The child cannot, under the 
circumstances, receive the care and attention he justly deserves 
and from these facts it is apparent we can account for the 
conduct of the child, and if continued, we cannot see that it 
is going to be for the best interest of the child. 
While it is true these facts as testified to by Respondent 
were controversial in many respects by. the Appellant, but 
who was in a better position to judge the truth of these things 
than the judge hearing the case, as he· states in his decision 
(Tr. 88-89-90): 
''The foregoing; statement is the background facts 
as founq by the court from the evidence adduced at 
. the hearing, which findings are, in the court's mind, 
the only _consistent fi~~ings one could .. make after see-
.. ing. the witnesses and hearing. the testimony in regard 
to those matters. . · - · 
~-~ ~ ~:'"~ 
. . . finds that the best . interests of the minor 
child, Bruce, . requires that he be ~eturn~d to the custody 
and control of the plaintiff, his ·mother, where the 
:15 
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original decree of divorce placed him; that the plaintiff 
. is a most fit ~nd suitable person to have the care and 
custody of said minor child; and concl~des from all 
the evidence in the case and the .attitude of the parties 
at t-he hearing, and matters \vhich don't appear upon 
the printed page, that the interests of the minor child 
would not be observed, but would be endangered, 
by awarding its custody to the defendant." 
In support of this proposition we quote from the decision 
of this court in the case of Walton v. Coffman et ux, 169 
p 2d 97: 
((As before stated this is an equity case. Harrison 
v. Harker, Supra; Jones v. Moore, Supra; Jensen v. 
Earley, Supra Wallick v._ Vance, Supra In re Barry, 
Supra. It is therefore our duty to carefully examine the 
record and make an independent determination of what 
the facts are. In so doing we should keep in mind that_ 
the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses and ob-
served their demeanor and was acquainted with the 
circumstances. surrounding the giving of their testi-
mony, and therefor \vas in a better position than we 
are to weigh and evaluate their evidence. Stanley v. 
Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 Pac. 2d 465, concurring 
opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe commencing at page 527 
of 97 Utah, 94 P. 2d 465." 
Appellant sets forth the fact that if the child is to go 
witf?. ·Respondent, its· mother, she will have no better home. to 
t~ke it to than he h~s at present. It is true that temporarily 
the child will be taken to the home of the mother of Respondent, 
but I respectfully request the court to examine the. testimony 
of Mrs. Ethel Kalian, the mother of Respondent as contained 
in.: (Tr.- 41. to 48 inc.), in ·which she testifies to the condition 
of her home and the care that will be given to this child and 
16 
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the love she has for him and the love he has for her, which 
will be until the Respondent remarries, which she expects to 
do in the near future. The child will be at least under the 
control of its mother, "'here it will be under her direction, 
without confusing the child as to having Htoo many bosses., 
I respectfully request the court to determine this from her 
testimony and the testin1ony of Respondent in this respect. 
Appellant has attempted to show, in a weak manner, that 
the Respondent is not a fit and proper person to take care of 
her child, because she was then and had been going out with 
a married man, (Tr. 34-35) (Tr. 84) and that Respondent 
was living at No. 234 North Main Street in Salt Lake City, 
and was registered there during all of that period as Mr. and 
Mrs. Fred Bacon, which Respondent admitted, but for some 
unknown reason counsel for Appellant did not press this issue, 
and there is no further testimony as to why Respondent was 
registered under the name of Mr. and Mrs. Fred Bacon_at that 
address. I-Iad he pressed this the true and proper reason 
would have been brought out, which would have its explanation 
from an economic basis and no other. 
The foregoin~ is all that was attempted to be proven by -
the Appellant of the unfitness of the ~espondent to have her 
child. The mere fact of her going with a married man, whose 
divorce from his former wife was then pending, and she in-
tended to marry him in due time, is ·certainly no evidence of 
her unfitness to have her child. 
The court said in Cooke v. Cooke et al, 248 P. 83, at page 
108: 
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CCThen~ too, the unfitness which deprives a parent of 
_the right to the custody of the .child must be positive, 
and not .m~!ely comparative? or merely speculative. And 
too, ~s her'etofore observed, the referee with respect to 
this . matter had before him the witnesses and heard 
their testimony. and found that there was .'no evidence 
or even a suspicion of. improper .relations between the 
defendant and Welch.' Thus a finding that the de-
.· fendant is unfit to have the custody of the child is 
· not, on the record del!landed or justified." 
We think we need not go further into this, as the evidence 
is entirely lacking as to the unfitness of Respondent to have 
and take care of her child. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN E:t~TERING ITS JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT AND AGAINST APPEL-
LANT FOR THE SUM OF $220.00, BEING THE AMOUNT 
FOR WHICH RESPONDENT WAS AT SAID TIME IN-
DEBTED TO THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL· REVE-
:NLJE ARISING OUT OF THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT 
FOR·A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS CLAIMED THE MINOR 
CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, AS A DEPENDENT· IN HER 
INCOME TAX RETURN AND ALSO ERRED IN REQUIR-
ING THE APPELLANT TO PAY ANY OTHER SUM OR 
SUMS FOR ·WHICH THE RESPONDENT MIGHT BE-
COME OBLIGATED TO PAYTHE COLLECTOR OF IN~ 
TERNAL REVENl.J~ BY .REASON OF_ RESPONDENT 
CLAIMING, SAID,· CHILD AS A DEPEN.DENT. 
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As outlined hereinabove, upon the granting of the divorce 
in favor of the Respondent and against the Appellant, the 
Respondent was not in a financial condition to care for the 
child, and that she had to go to work to support herself. The 
child \Yas temporarily placed with her mother some two months. 
(Tr. 20). The mother of Respondent, because of her 
crowded condition at her home was not able to care for the 
child further and it was necessary for Respondent to find a 
suitable place for the child. She testified that the Appellant 
told her: 
HWhen we were separated, that he wouldn't pay me any 
money for the child nor myself if he had to rot in jail, so I let 
Bruce go down there to live (T-22). ((We also talked about 
who would claim Bruce as a dependent. I said I would, and 
he agreed to it." (Tr. 22). That was for the purpose of her 
income tax. She further stated on cross~examination as fol-
lows: 
Q. Now, are you sure--positive--there was anything 
in the agreement about his, about your taking the 
<;hild as a dependent ? 
A. We talked about it very definitely (Tr. 33). 
In view of the statement of the Appellant, that he would 
not give to Respondent any money for the child or herself 
and that he would rather rot in jail, and her inability to take 
care of the child, the Respondent was placed in a position where 
she had to do the best she could under the circumstances. She 
stated definitely that if the Appellant would take the child, 
she would not expect to receive anything for the support of 
the child, but at no time did she release the Appellant from 
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the payment of alimony. She testified in response to a question 
of . Appellant's counsel, that the agreement was to relieve 
Appellant from the payment of alimony, that CCI told him if 
Bruce was well taken care of, there wouldn't be any trouble 
( T r. 27) . Again the question was put to Respondent by 
counsel and she testified: cc I didn't say :he should be released." 
(Tr. 33). 
1·he Appellant denies that· anything was said about per-
mitting Respondent to take the child as a dependent on her 
income tax, but the court found that such an agreement was 
tnade and in accordance there\vith held that she had waived her 
right to alimony in any sum in excess of that which 
plaintiff shall be required to pay to the Federal Gov-
ernment, but in accordance with such an a greement that 
she should be entitled to the amounts she would be com-
pelled to pay the Collector of Internal Revenue by reason of 
taking the child as a dependent. 
It is the contention of Respondent that until such time 
as the court modifies a decree for the payment of alimony, 
that the decree stands and the unpaid alimony accrues, unless 
by circun1stances,. the party entitled to it in some manner 
Vv'aives it, \vhich the court~ in this case found Respondent had 
done except as ~tipulated in their agreement and in place 
thereof. substituted the agreement between said parties 
to permit · ·the Respondent to take the ·child as a de-
pend~nt, and that the Appell~nt had breached this agree-
ment with the Respondent. · Respondent has not been mer-
cenary. regarding this matter and has not certairtly imposed 
any unreasonable hardship on Appellant by giving up some-
thing far more substantial than she Was to receive. 
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I feel reasonably certain that unless said agreement was 
actually made between these two parties, Respondent would 
not have taken or continued to take the child as a dependent 
on her income tax as a n1eans to get someting out of the Ap-
pellant in an indirect manner. What prompted her to take 
the child as a dependent if it \vasn' t the agreement~ 
Appellant contends that it was her duty at least to notify 
him of this-that he knew nothing about it until before Christ-
mas_, 1950. I cannot see where this makes any difference .. Re-
spondent is in a like con~tion wi~ Appellant as he contends 
for. She did not know that he was taking the child as a depend-
ent during this time and he never notified her. Had she known 
this, she would have in all probabiliyt taken some action against 
the Appellant to straighten this out. She certainly knew that 
both of them could not take the child as a dependent and she 
would not have continued to take the child and get herself into 
difficulties with the Internal Revenue Department, which must 
inevitably come, and did come. Because of the delay on the 
part of the Internal Revenue Department in discovering these 
things, she was not notified by them until some three years 
after she had been taking the child as a dependent. This ques-
tion resolves itself on a quetsion of fact, and the court so found 
that such an agreement was made and Appellant certainly can-
not complain in getting off as easily as he did in this decision. 
If such an agreement . was not made, then the Respondent 
would be entitled to all accrued alimony, unless otherwise 
waived through the latches of Respondent, or from some other 
sufficient cause, which we do not think she did in this case. 
Respondent never remarried, never waived or released the 
Appellant from the alimony, nor did he at any time petition 
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the court to modify- the decree in· relation thereto, and just. 
because he took care ·of the child this certainly does not relieve 
him from the alimony judgment for the Respondent. I think 
the complaint should come from the Respondent, rather- than 
the Appellant, with relation to the finding of the court. 
.. 
We think nothing further need be said about this and 
lef the matter -be submitted on the testimony of said parties 
as to vtho was correct in this. 
POINT III 
THE CO_URT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT AND AGAINST THE 
RESPONDENT MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
SO AS TO RELIEVE THE APPELLANT FROM THE PAY-
MENT OF FUTURE ALIMO~TY TO RESPONDENT. 
Under Section 40-3-5 U. C. A._ 1943, the court always 
retains jurisdiction of divorce action so as to modify the decree 
- entered to. fit the circumstances of the parties where there is 
changed conditions_ which would justify a modification, such as 
the disposition of the children, support of children, and 
alimony. 
We respectfully submit that the Appellant in his answer 
(Tr. 9 to 15) has made no allegations with respect to changed 
conditions of said ·parties since the decree- was entered which 
would entitle hirri to a modification of the decree. It is true 
that temporary arrangements were made between said parties, 
themselves with ·relation to the custody of the child and its 
s-upport until· such time as Respondent was in a position to 
againtakecareofthe child. She is now in a position to properly 
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care for the child and under the evidence the court has seen 
fit, in its discretion, to grant her the right to take the child 
into her custody according to the provisions of the original 
decree, and the court did not see fit to disturb the provisions 
of the original decree. Had the court seen fit to deprive the 
Respondent of the custody of the child in this hearing and 
award the custody of the child to Appellant, then the question 
of support money and alimony should probably have been 
been modified to fit the circumstances, but inasmuch as the 
court did not see fit to change the provisions of the <?riginal 
decree, the Appellant has _shown no grounds of changed cir-
cumstances which would justify a modification of the decree. 
The Respondent has never remarried, nor has her financial 
condition changed sufficiently to justify a reduction of alimony 
or support money. She testified she was earning about $130.00 
per month, (Tr. 41) and has been supporting herself with 
this. Her earnings are net sufficient for her to properly take 
care of and educate this child without the assistance on the 
part of the Appell~nt, in view of the increased cost of living 
since this divorce has been granted. $~,o~oo a month is not 
sufficient to care for this child, nor the sum of $50.00 a month 
as alimony is certainly not excessive to further aid her in this 
duty. 
The only changed circumstances that the Appellant has 
shown is that he has remarried. In fact, that has enhanced 
his financial condition as both he and his wife have been work-
ing and are working. His income as testified to by him is 
$400.00 per month with a take home pay of approximately 
$350.00 per month (Tr. 49). His present wife testified she 
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is earning $90.00 every two weeks, without deductions (Tr. 
73). They have only one child to support. Mr. Stuber, the 
Appellant, testified that he has been paying to his mother the 
sum of $60.00 per month for the care of the child in question 
without objection, but now he wants the court to modify the 
decree, cutting down the alimony to Respondent. With his 
income and the income of the Appellant, with the increased 
cost of living, and the increasing cost of caring for and edu-
cating this child, we are firmly of the opinion that Appellant 
has shown no changed circumstances to justify this .. 
Our courts have repeatedly held that unless sufficient 
changed circumstances are shown, the court has no authority-
to modify a decree· in this respect. 
This is well supported in the case of Hamilton v. Ham-
ilton, 58 P. 2d, 11, wherein the court said: 
UThe power of a court to make amendments in 
particulars authorized by the statute just quoted is 
not without limits. Thus, in the absence of changed 
conditions or circumstances, a modification of a decree 
may not be had. Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 Pac. 
952; Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah, 150, 193 P. 1093, 
15 A. L. R. 620; Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah, 112, 202 P. 
213; Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah, 261, 225 Pac. 76; 
Carson v. Carson, (Utah) 47 P. 2d 894. 
We think we need nor argue this question further, as it 
is a matter of fact which is based on the evidence and showing 
here, that the Appellant has neither alleged or proven any 
changed circumstances which would justify the court, in its, 
discretion, to modify the decree with relation to alimony. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RE-
SPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF $100.00. 
Appellant argues that because of the holding of the 
court that the Respondent was not entitled to recover fron1 
the Appellant the amount she sued for in arrears on alimony, 
to-wit: $3,500.00, she was not entitled to an award of attor-
ney's fees. 
She was compelled to bring her action against the Ap-
pellant to force him to do anything by way of paying alimony 
or the recovery of the custody of the said child. 
The court in its decision (Tr. 89) states as follows: 
H • • • and that defendant should not be held liable 
for any arrearages of support money, nor in the pay-
ment of alimony in any sum in excess of that which 
plaintiff shall be required to pay to the Federal Gov-
ernment, as indicated above in this m~morandum, but 
that defendant should pay to the plaintiff or for her 
use and benefit such sums as plaintiff may be com-
pelled to pay the Federal Government as deficiencies 
on her income tax.'' 
In accordance with the coutt' s decision the court made and 
entered in its findings of fact regarding this matter the fol-
lowing (Tr. 93): 
"The plaintiff has waived her right to receive from 
the defendant any amount as alimony payments in 
arrears in excess of the amount or amounts she will 
be compelled to pay the Collector of Internal Revenue 
as herein set forth.'' 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
While it is true .the court found that the plaintiff was 
not entitled to recover the full amount she asked for as unpaid 
alimony, but the amount the court did allow her, which was . 
the amount she would have to pay to the Collector of Internal 
Revenue, was designated as alimony in the decision of the 
court and in the findings. If this amount was designated as 
alimony, which I construe it to be by the wording of the decision 
of the court and in its findings, then the argument of the Ap-
pellant fails. The fact that Respondent did not recover a 
judgment against the Appellant for the full amount she asked 
for does not change the fact that the amount- awarded to her 
was for alimony, and she had to bring the action to enforce 
it. In accordance with the law made and provided in such 
cases, she was certainly entitled to recover an attorney's fee · 
for the use and benefit of her attorney in this matter. 
Appellant further contends that because the Respondent 
was working and earning the sun1 of $130.00 per month, that 
this should relieve the Appellant of paying her attorney's fees. 
Herzog v. Bramel, 23 P. 2nd, 345: 
((Under statutes and codes similar to ours, we think 
it is generally recognized that the enforcement by cita-
tion or an order to show cause or by contempt proceed-
ings, or orders or decrees with respect to the payment 
of monthly or other specific periods of alimony and 
counsel fees, for a failure and a willful refusal to pay 
the same, is one of the inherent equity powers of the 
court. Such has been everyday's practice in this juris-
diction for many years." 
\V e think it will not b~ questioned that the court has the 
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right to award attorney's fees and costs in contempt proceed-
ings or orders to show cause, and we need not cite further cases. 
The courts have repeatedly held that such awards are 
within the sound discretion of the court hearing the matter. 
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 Pac. 364. While this 
may be based upon necessity, we think the court from th(! 
evidence adduced can readily determine the necessity from 
the facts. A wife does not have to be .destitute in order to 
receive such an award. This court has made such awards in 
cases where no testimony was introduced with relation to such 
necessities, and we quote the following: 
Weis v. Weis, 179 Pac. 2nd 1005 at 1010 (Utah): 
HThis appeal is on the judgment roll. We do not 
have the testimony on the question of the defendant's 
necessity before us, so we must assume that the evidence 
supported the awards. The statute does not contem-
plate the awards for expenses of suit or for temporary 
alimony should be made only in those cases where the 
'adverse party' (usually the wife) is destitute or 
practically so. It contemplates such awards when in the 
sound discretion of the court, the circumstances of the 
parties are such that in fairness to the wife she should 
be given financial assistance by her husband in her 
prosecution or defense of the divorce action, and for 
her support during its pendency. Keeaer, Marriage and 
Divorce (3rd 7d.) Section 604, page 679." 
The testimony was that Respondent was earning $130.00 
per month, and in comparison with the income of the Appel-
lant and his present wife, she was entitled to attorney's fees 
to help her prosecute this action in the sound discretion of 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the court and she should be allo,ved additional attorney's fees 
to defray her expenses and counsel fees in this appeal in ac-
cordance with the decision of this court in Dahlberg v. Dahl-
berg, 292 Pac. 214. 
'There is n1uch more that could be said in this matter 
and many more decisions that could be produced, but we think 
sufficient has been set forth herein to entitle the Respondent 
to have the decision of the trial court sustained in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BENJAMIN SPENCE, 
Attorney for Respondent. 
1309 Walker Bank Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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